DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 164 758 CE 017 049

AUTHOR Shimberg, Benjamin
TITLE Statement before Subcommittee on Monopoly, Small Business Committee, United States Senate, Washington, D.C.
INSTITUTION Educational Testing Service, Princeton, N.J. Center for Occupational and Professional Assessment.
PUB DATE 7 Jun 77
NOTE 16p.; Paper presented before the Subcommittee on Monopoly, Small Business Committee, United States Senate (Washington, D.C., June 7, 1977)

EDRS PRICE MF-$0.83 HC-$1.67 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Accountability; *Certification; Consumer Protection; Discipline Problems; Evaluation Methods; Federal Government; Federal Regulation; Federal State Relationship; *Governance; Government Role; Legislation; Qualifications; Role Conflict; Self Evaluation; *State Licensing Boards; Testing
IDENTIFIERS *Occupational Licensing Boards

ABSTRACT

Self-regulation by autonomous occupationally-dominated boards creates an inherent conflict of interest. Consumers are wondering whether what they get by way of protection is worth the economic and social costs. Perhaps the weakest links in the regulatory chain are enforcement and discipline. Few practitioners are suspended or have their licenses revoked for incompetence. Grounds for suspension and revocation often require so much proof that even repeat offenders are seldom disciplined. Questions need to be asked. Would the absence of regulation significantly endanger the public health, safety, or welfare? Are there better methods of regulation? Also concern has been expressed about testing in order to gain licenses. Are tests and other screening procedures objective, reliable, and valid? Other concerns are evaluations, consistency with legislative intent, responsiveness to consumers, disciplinary actions, and accountability to the public, press, and legislature. These problems call for structural changes in the way licensing is organized and in the authority/accountability structure. Some encouraging developments in the area of regulatory reform have been taking place in Wisconsin. For example, an Occupational Standards Board has been created to review licensing rules and actions. In addition, the federal government should establish a clearinghouse for information and guidance, review the actions of the Intergovernmental Personnel Act, set up a grant program to help states deal with licensing problems, and increase consumer awareness. (CT)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

ED164758

STATEMENT

by

BENJAMIN SHIMBERG, Ph.D.
Associate Director
Center for Occupational and Professional Assessment
Educational Testing Service
Princeton, New Jersey

Before

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MONOPOLY
SMALL BUSINESS COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES SENATE
Washington, D.C.

June 7, 1977

OE 017049

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

Dr. Benjamin Shimberg

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC) AND USERS OF THE ERIC SYSTEM."

STATEMENT BY Dr. Benjamin Shimberg *
Associate Director - COPA
Educational Testing Service
Princeton, N.J.

BEFORE Subcommittee on Monopoly
Small Business Committee
United States Senate
June 7, 1977

Occupational licensing is suffering a crisis of confidence. People are becoming cynical about the need for so much regulation. They are asking, "If licensing is supposed to be good for the public how come it is the trade and professional groups -- not the public -- that are clamoring for licensing? What's in it for them?"

The growing suspicion of the entire regulatory enterprise has been heightened by revelations that a number of trade and professional groups are using the power of licensing boards to foster anticompetitive practices. Some boards also use their authority to set standards as a way of restricting the supply of practitioners. This is done by setting excessively high entry requirements or by erecting barriers which make it difficult for skilled workers and professionals to move from one state to another. Many people are saying that all this smacks of monopoly -- sanctioned by the state.

What is especially disturbing is the enormous proliferation that is taking place. Each year legislators are besieged by groups seeking to become regulated. It is important to note that demands for regulation seldom come from a public seeking to be protected. It is generally the trade or professional association that drafts the proposed bill and then lobbys to get it enacted.

Regulatory legislation sponsored by occupational groups has usually sought to place authority in the hands of a board made up primarily of practitioners. They have also sought as much autonomy as possible. This tradition of self-regulation by autonomous, occupationally-dominated boards creates an inherent conflict of interest.

Individually, most of the board members I have known are hard-working, dedicated people -- often leaders in their chosen occupation or profession. They devote long hours, including many nights and weekends to board business. They must often forego professional income to participate in board activities.

---

* The views expressed in this paper are those of Dr. Shimberg and do not necessarily reflect those of Educational Testing Service or its officers.

In their own eyes and in the eyes of their professional colleagues they are serving the public as well as the profession. Few indeed appear to be involved in licensing for personal or financial gain. Yet as we look at licensing broadly and listen to reports of anticompetitive activity and other abuses, we sense that somewhere, somehow, something has gone wrong. Could the inherent conflict of interest I alluded to earlier be one of the root causes? Do board members unconsciously, perhaps, display a Charlie Wilson mentality which equates what's good for the profession with what's good for the public?

We don't have clear answers to these questions, but increasingly consumers are beginning to ask whether what they get by way of protection is worth the economic and social costs. They are calling for greater accountability. Unfortunately, some of the efforts to achieve accountability haven't worked too well. For example, legislators have sometimes placed autonomous boards into umbrella agencies. Looking at an organization chart, one might conclude that under such an arrangement boards would now be accountable to the agency director. But it doesn't necessarily always work out that way. Many umbrella agencies are essentially housekeeping units. They provide a host of administrative services, but the director may have no authority to delve into substantive matters, to get involved in policy formulation, or to review actions of various boards. Thus, boards retain their autonomy where it really counts.

It is only recently that people have begun to ask whether such a system of occupational regulation works for the public interest. About ten years ago, Dr. Howard Rosen, Director of Research in what is now the Employment and Training Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor, initiated studies of the impact of licensing on job entry and on the mobility of skilled workers from one state to another. Before that, virtually nothing was known about how licensing operated or what its economic or social impact might be. These Department of Labor studies helped to document the restrictive practices of certain boards. They showed, for example, that requirements for licensure were often arbitrary and not job related; that locally developed tests used to assess competency often failed to meet even the most rudimentary professional standards; that the constitutional right of applicants and licensees to due process was often ignored by boards. One interesting study

by Professor Elton Ryack at the University of Rhode Island suggests that some boards manipulate the passing rate on licensing examinations according to supply and demand considerations. In four New England states, failure rates on licensing exams fluctuated directly with unemployment figures. During periods of high employment, failures tended to be low; but when unemployment rose, so did the failure rate!

Historically, boards have placed most of their emphasis on screening applicants -- keeping out those judged to be incompetent. However, once an individual is licensed, he is usually licensed for life. Boards have seldom sought to check up on a licensee to find out whether he has maintained his competence. Without such periodic reassessment, the consumer is lulled into a false sense of security. He comes to believe that if a practitioner is licensed he must be competent.

Perhaps the weakest links in the regulatory chain are enforcement and discipline. Most boards have focused so much of their attention on the screening function that investigation of complaints and disciplinary action have been neglected. Relatively few practitioners are suspended or have their licenses revoked for incompetence. The grounds for suspension and revocation often require such a high level of proof that it is extremely difficult to discipline even repeated offenders. Here again licensing has failed to provide the public with the protection it thought it was getting.

This is indeed a gloomy picture. You may be wondering, are there any bright spots -- any encouraging signs to report? Is anything being done to bring licensing under more effective public control?

For a number of years my research efforts were directed toward ferreting out and documenting abuses. Then I began to think about what might be done to bring about needed change -- about ways to improve the situation. For the past three years I have spent much of my time on a demonstration project which involves looking for the bright spots or, more specifically, for places where problems were being dealt with in a constructive manner; for ideas that would help states improve their licensing practices. During the first phase of the project, which was supported by the Department of Labor, I organized four regional conferences that were attended by State legislators, directors of licensing agencies, attorneys general, governors' aides, and consumer officials. All told, there were about 150 State officials

from 30 states. During the conferences, we focused on identifying problems that states have in common, getting ideas about possible solutions, and trying to determine the extent to which State officials might be interested and willing to cooperate in sharing their ideas and working on solutions to their common problems.

The results of these conferences were sufficiently encouraging for the USDL to grant us additional funds to work cooperatively with states to identify specific ways of dealing with problems that had been identified at the conferences. We set out to compile a handbook or resource file that would help states improve their licensing systems and thereby increase the likelihood that licensing boards would serve the public interest rather than the interests of the occupation or profession.

Time does not permit a detailed recounting of all that we have learned to date, but I would like to share with you a few developments that I find encouraging.

You will recall that one of the problems of great concern was the proliferation of licensing. We found that two states, Virginia and Minnesota, have developed procedures for screening requests for regulation from new occupational groups. Both approaches involve the use of commissions to study all such requests in detail and then report back to the legislature. The techniques adopted by these states appear to be working and have helped to reduce proliferation. A few groups were granted licensure; others had to settle for less restrictive forms of regulation; many were turned down altogether. We are endeavoring to make legislators in other states aware of this process and encouraging them to adopt similar procedures in their own states.

While Virginia and Minnesota are trying to cut back on the licensure of new groups, Common Cause has been urging State legislators to take a hard look at occupations that are already licensed. To date at least a dozen states have enacted Sunset laws. In most states the initial focus of Sunset has been on agencies that regulate occupations and professions. Our staff has been following closely what has been happening in Colorado -- the first state to have a Sunset law -- and advising other states on ways to strengthen the Sunset process. For example, we have tried to expand on the evaluative criteria in the Colorado law by formulating a series of questions that we

feel an auditor should raise in the course of any comprehensive Sunset review.

The first, and perhaps the most critical question of all, relates to the need for continued regulation. The auditor should ask: Would the absense of regulation significantly endanger the public health, safety, or welfare?

When occupational groups go to the legislature to seek regulation, they almost invariably ask for licensure since this gives them maximum control -- indeed a legal monopoly over all who practice in the occupation. All too frequently, the request is granted without an adequate exploration of alternatives. We feel that the auditor should ask: Is there another less restrictive method of regulation that could adequately protect the public? Might registration or certification accomplish the same purpose? The Sunset approach provides an opportunity to reexamine these questions. If an alternative approach seems feasible, the legislature should be encouraged to change the law accordingly.

Suppose, however, that in your Sunset review you find there is justification for continued regulation. You are now ready to examine various facets of program operation. A key question relates to requirements. The auditor should ask: Are all requirements for entry into an occupation clearly related to safe and effective practice? Are any of the requirements unnecessarily restrictive or exclusionary?

Here the auditor or evaluator would look for evidence that an acceptable job analysis has been conducted and that there is a clear linkage between licensing requirements and job requirements. Those relating to citizenship, residency, age, and years of formal schooling would probably fail the test of job relevance and ought to be discarded. Other requirements, such as good moral character, if retained at all, should be carefully circumscribed so that a prior conviction could be considered as disqualifying only if the offense is directly related to the occupation or profession.

This brings us to a closely related criterion question: Does every qualified person, including those from out-of-state or from a foreign country, have an equal opportunity to become credentialed?

This matter warrants careful scrutiny because boards have frequently used their power in an arbitrary manner to restrict the supply of practitioners. The legislature undoubtedly intended that boards set standards to keep out incompetents, but those standards should apply equally to residents and to

those from out-of-state. Indeed, the granting of licenses to out-of-staters should depend solely on their qualifications, not on the existence of reciprocity agreements that tend to penalize qualified individuals who wish to migrate to a state with which their home state does not happen to have a reciprocity arrangement.

Testing has been a recurrent concern. The criterion question might be: Are the written and/or performance examinations job-related? Do the procedures used in developing, administering, and scoring the tests meet acceptable professional and legal standards? Is there evidence that these tests and other screening procedures are objective, reliable, and valid?

The evaluator should find out who makes the tests and what their qualifications are, how often the tests are revised, and how "secure" the system is. Nor should the fact that an agency is using national examinations necessarily preclude a review of their quality.

Another area that merits consideration is that of service to applicants. Does the agency evaluate qualifications in an expeditious manner? Do candidates have an opportunity to challenge administratively any requirement or decision that they deem to be arbitrary, not job-related, or invalid?

Turning now to the matter of rules and regulations, the criterion question might be: Are all rules and regulations promulgated by the agency consistent with the legislative intent? Do any of the rules have the effect of restricting competition or otherwise serving primarily the interests of the occupational group rather than those of the public?

Here is where we get into prohibitions on advertising, bans on competitive bidding, and other restrictive practices. The woods are full of rules that have nothing to do with protecting the public. Such rules need to be brought into the open and challenged. They should be expunged unless they can be justified as serving the public interest.

In Colorado, the auditor found that one board was "turning off" consumers by requiring that all complaints be in writing and notarized. This leads one to ask a more general question: How responsive has the agency been to complaints of consumers? Are all complaints investigated promptly and thoroughly? What action has the agency taken to resolve complaints that might properly come within its jurisdiction?

In this instance, the auditor would want to examine the adequacy of the record-keeping system, how complaints are tracked, how long it takes to get action, and whether the disposition of claims results in satisfactory resolution from the consumer's viewpoint.

Now let us move into the area of discipline. In view of what we know about the weakness of enforcement activity on the part of many boards, it is only appropriate to ask: Are disciplinary actions against licensees carried out in an expeditious manner with adequate due process safeguards? Is there a sufficient number of trained investigators? How many licenses have actually been suspended or revoked during the past three years for fraud, incompetence, and other serious offenses? Are there other disciplinary strategies being used to achieve rehabilitation or to provide restitution to injured parties?

Finally, we come to the whole issue of accountability. Is the board accountable primarily to the association and to members of the occupation or to the public? Here we are looking for checks and balances, for indications that any self-serving activity will be caught before it is promulgated as a rule, for assurance that every decision that is made will be in the public interest, not in the interest of the occupational group.

In this connection, one might also inquire as to whether a board has filed required reports and whether they contain information about what the board has done to serve the public. Has the board made a serious effort to keep the public, the press, and the legislature informed of its activities? Has it sought to involve representatives of the public in its rule hearings? How responsive has it been to the views expressed by the public at such hearings?

It is our belief that the information elicited by these and similar questions can serve to identify the strengths and weaknesses in regulatory programs. Some weaknesses and shortcomings can undoubtedly be remedied by administrative action; some may require changes in the basic statute governing a particular occupation or profession. However, the most serious problems are likely to call for structural changes in the way licensing is organized and in the authority/accountability structure.

One of the most encouraging developments in the area of regulatory reform that we have encountered this past year is taking place in the Wisconsin legislature. A joint legislative committee has been studying occupational and professional licensing for more than a year. We believe that the process that this committee has followed has the potential for achieving reforms in the area of licensing that are considerably more far-reaching than those likely to occur under Sunset.

I would like to summarize briefly a few of the things that have been happening in Wisconsin. First, the Legislative Council staff prepared a set of excellent background and issue papers on a wide variety of topics. A number of the papers dealt with licensure requirements -- such as age, sex, citizenship, residency, good moral character. Other papers dealt with such topics as reciprocity, advertising, conflict of interest, and the role of public members on regulatory boards.

Each of the papers served as an agenda item. The topic was thoroughly discussed, resource people were brought in, options explored, and decisions made. For example, it was decided to permit advertising of any product or service for which a fee could be set. The good moral character requirement was abolished. Henceforth only good professional character can be taken into consideration. Good professional character is presumed to exist in the absence of a felony conviction <u>directly</u> related to the occupation or profession.

The Committee examined 19 occupations and professions and decided that all but one (watchmakers) should continue to be regulated. However, they decided that, for 9 of the occupations, while licensing was desirable, no boards were necessary. The occupation could be regulated by the Department. For the remaining occupations, where boards were retained, the Committee recommended substantially reducing the amount of power the boards could exercise. This has been accomplished by creating a new entity -- an Occupational Standards Board. This is to be a lay board with broad rule-making authority. Indeed, the Occupational Standards Board is to have review power over proposed rules and actions of both the boards and the regulatory agency itself. Thus, in effect, decision power on all important matters will be lodged in a lay group. This is an accountability model that makes a lot of sense.

We have also been following closely the legislation recently passed in California which places a majority of public members on all occupational licensing boards, except those in the health related professions and accounting. We hope to learn from California the criteria and practices used in selecting public members, how they were oriented, what problems were encountered, what impact they have had, and what resources need to be provided to increase their effectiveness. We are in touch with other states that have also had experience with recruiting, training, and providing reinforcement to public members. We plan to summarize as much of this information as we can in a handbook, making it easier for other states to build on the successes and avoid some of the pitfalls of those who have been experimenting with public members.

One last bright spot I want to share with you relates to the topic of enforcement and discipline. We found in our contacts with State officials responsible for discipline that there was virtually no communication among them. They didn't know who their counterparts were in other states or how investigation and enforcement were handled in the state next door.

We undertook to play a catalytic role. As we found enforcement officials who were really concerned with the problem and trying to do a good job, we would put them in contact with others with similar interest. Before long, they began to talk about the need for a meeting -- a chance to exchange ideas. We encouraged some of the leaders to get together and to begin planning a conference. There were no funds available, but people were willing to give their time -- some even dug into their own pockets to pay for the postage needed to publicize the meeting.

A meeting was scheduled for June 3-5 in New Orleans. More than 150 officials from 35 states have registered -- including enforcement officials, legislators, agency administrators, attorneys general, and many board members. A truly exciting program has been arranged. It deals with such topics as: Innovative Case Finding Techniques; How to Get Maximum Investigation at Minimum Cost; Administrative Hearings - Fair or Farce?; Publicity: The Public's Right to Know vs. Trial by Media; Should Hearing Officers Replace Boards?; and Recruitment, Training, and Supervision of Investigators.

I find this development extremely encouraging. First, because it has all been done on a cooperative basis. The conference materialized because the people involved wanted it to happen. Second, it provides an opportunity for productive exchange of ideas. It could be an important beginning; but it could come to naught if there is no follow up and reinforcement.

These are a few of the bright spots that I see. I am greatly encouraged by the interest that is being shown in regulatory reform --- by the emergence of leadership at the state level, and by the fact that there is a growing recognition by the Congress and by a number of Federal agencies that occupational licensing is a national problem -- not exclusively a state or local problem.

What can the Federal government do to support the forces that are working to bring about change in the regulatory structure, to make licensing more equitable, to insure that such licensing as is really needed serves the public interest?

I see four areas where the Federal government can play a constructive role. First, I would urge that Congress establish a clearinghouse where State people can get information and guidance on ways to effect change in the regulatory structure, and provide the states with support services that will increase the likelihood that the changes that are made will take hold and persist.

In a sense, our staff has been fulfilling this clearinghouse function in a very limited way. We get dozens of calls every week from legislators and state officials. We get referrals from such groups as the Council of State Governments, and the National Association of Attorneys General. Sometimes, people want factual information -- what's licensed where, and what the requirements are? More often, however, it is a request for information about who is doing what? Which states have dealt with a given problem? Whom to contact? Where to get dependable information? We do our best to respond to these requests. We send out copies of relevant materials: we provide names and addresses of potential resource people; and we share whatever we have.

But who will respond to these inquiries when our project is finished, when our staff goes off to do other things, and when our records are put

into storage? Who will keep track of what is going on and provide up-to-date information to people seeking assistance?

The failure to provide for continuity can have unfortunate consequences. Several years ago, the Department of Labor provided funds to the American Bar Foundation to develop model legislation and to act as a catalyst in removing legislative impediments to the employment of ex-offenders. It was an excellent project and it was getting positive results in the form of legislative change. But it had been funded for a limited period as a demonstration project. When funds ran out, the project was terminated. The momentum that had been built up was lost. As far as I know, the project is in limbo. The very knowledgeable and creative staff has gone on to other things. I feel that it is socially wasteful to allow such things to happen.

Some way must be found to institutionalize important projects for which a continuing need exists. I see a need for continuing help to states in the area of licensing. If no provision is made to provide such help, whatever progress has been made is likely to be lost.

But a clearinghouse is not enough. Some way needs to be found to provide active support to State officials who are interested in effecting change -- developing better testing procedures, improving their enforcement efforts, training board members and board staff to fulfill their responsibilities more effectively.

My second recommendation is that the committee review what has been accomplished over the past few years under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act. Evidently Congress felt that strengthening state and local personnel systems was a legitimate Federal concern. Under IPA, grant funds are available to states on a continuing basis to help them build up their staffs. Not only have local resources been strengthened through research and training, but the exchange of information and the sharing of resources among states has been facilitated.

It seems to me that a similar approach in the licensing area might be an effective way for the Federal government to support change in the states. Because the states vary greatly in their interests and needs, a grant program seems like an appropriate way to help states to deal with problems that they think are important. One state may want to work on testing,

another on training of board members, another on strengthening consumer services, and still another on a legislative strategy to reduce proliferation. Cooperative projects among states might be encouraged to avoid duplication of effort, as well as to facilitate the exchange of ideas.

I view a national clearinghouse and a grant program along the lines of IPA as two ways in which the Federal government can support and encourage needed change in the states. A third support area should be research related to licensing. I believe that this is a legitimate Federal concern. We all recognize that the methods used to assess competency have important implications for the development and utilization of the nation's skilled manpower. We also recognize that there is a close relationship between the competency of practitioners and the protection of consumers. Such considerations, it seems to me, argue that it would be in the public interest to support research into better ways of measuring initial competency as well as ways to insure continued competency over time.

The testing community has responded to the growing demand for competency measures by drawing heavily on the stockpile of existing knowledge. It has also become engaged in developing new testing techniques. Meeting the challenges requires a substantial expenditure of time and money. Moreover, it is vital that this development work proceed unimpeded and that the testing community's efforts be supplemented. Testing techniques that have proved to be dependable and useful for measuring academic achievement and in making employment decisions are not always applicable in the licensing situation. Employers need to rank people from the best to poorest so as to select those who are the most likely to succeed on the job. In the licensing situation, a board usually seeks to separate those who meet some standard of acceptability from those who do not meet the standard. This difference in purpose raises a number of thorny testing problems. For example, experts do not agree as to what constitutes acceptable evidence of validity for the standard or how passing points should be set. Disagreement on such critical issues underscores the need for both theoretical and applied research.

A national institute for competency assessment could work with the states and the testing community to provide the needed leadership for identifying the

critical questions and for coordinating research to find solutions. Such an institute should be concerned with new approaches and with new instrumentation that go beyond the paper and pencil and even beyond the practical exams and simulation exercises that are presently being used. Techniques that are appropriate for determining readiness for professional practice of the new practitioner may not be suitable for use with practitioners who have been in the field for a number of years. What role might computers play in determining how well a practitioner can deal with complex diagnostic problems? Are there cost effective ways to simulate the judgments a practitioner must make in real life? Can patient records and other behavioral sampling techniques be used to make dependable judgments about which practitioners are doing a good job and which are not?

Some of the worst abuses in licensing occur because legislators and boards impose excessive education and experience requirements. Before we can formulate standards by which to make judgments about the reasonableness or validity of such requirements, we need to devise better ways of analyzing the ingregients that make up competence and which of these are most critical from the viewpoint of the social purpose that licensing serves.

I can think of no better long-range investment than for the Federal government to support research that will strengthen the knowledge base on which competency testing is built and, at the same time, provide better techniques by which this important societal function can be carried out.

Now I come to the fourth and final leg of my action agenda. Even with a clearinghouse and a technical support program, and even with a vigorous, ongoing research program, we need to recognize that changes in the regulatory structure and in the policies that govern regulatory practices are not likely to come easily. To stimulate citizen awareness of how licensing affects the pocketbook, there needs to be a stronger Federal initiative in the consumer sector. Congress should give consumer agencies a clear directive and adequate resources to work with state groups to make the public more aware of the significance of licensing: how restrictions on entry and anticompetitive practices increase the cost of services, how exclusionary restrictions inhibit job entry and job mobility; how lax enforcement robs them of protection they have every right to expect. By working with and supporting consumers and other citizen action groups at the grassroots level, by

letting people know what changes are needed and what they can do to bring about change, I believe that many of the abuses enumerated earlier can be erradicated or at least ameliorated.

Basically I am an optimist. Even though I realize that there are some powerful forces working against change, I have faith that people working together -- working within the system -- can effect change even in deeply entrenched institutions. Unfortunately, the people seeking change face an unequal contest. Those with vested interests to protect are likely to carry the day, unless government intervenes to help the weaker side. I believe that the research and support services I have outlined -- coupled with activity already underway in the courts and in various Federal agencies -- will go a long way toward achieving needed reforms in the regulatory sphere.